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STARE DECISIS AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESSt
EDWARD D. RE*
"Law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still."
-ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY
These words refer to the two ideals that must be harmonized and
reconciled within an effective legal system-stability and change. Stability
requires continuity with the past and is necessary to permit members of a
society to conduct their daily affairs with a reasonable degree of certainty
as to the legal consequences of their acts. Change implies a variation or
alteration of that which is fixed and stable. Without change there can be
no progress. This Article will explore the function of stare decisis in the
attainment of these two seemingly contradictory ideals within the judicial
process.
Basic to this discussion is the understanding that in a common law
system a judicial decision serves a dual function: First, it settles the con-
troversy, since under the doctrine of res judicata the parties may not reliti-
gate the issues that have been decided; and second, it has precedential
value under the doctrine of stare decisis. This latter doctrine, derived from
the maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere (stand by the decision and
do not disturb what is settled) is rooted in the common law policy that a
principle of law deduced from a judicial decision will be considered and
applied in the determination of a future similar case. In essence, this policy
reflects the likelihood that a similar case arising in the future will be
decided in the same way. In a common law system, wherein the law is
enunciated and developed through judicial decisions, this doctrine is abso-
lutely essential. It was indispensable in the early periods of the common
law when legislative enactments were both few in number and usually
limited to the area of public law.
Stare decisis was received in the United States as part of the common
law tradition. In addition to fostering stability and permitting the develop-
ment of a consistent and coherent body of law, it also served other benefi-
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cial functions: it preserved continuity, manifested respect for the past,
assured equality of treatment for litigants similarly situated, spared judges
the task of reexamining rules of law with each succeeding case, and af-
forded to the law a desirable measure of predictability. These concepts,
developed in the course of hundreds of years of judicial experience, require
further consideration as a result of today's era of massive legislative activ-
ity. Since the doctrine of precedents continues to serve a useful and benefi-
cial function, it is always appropriate to examine and reexamine its appli-
cability and limitations.
What is the doctrine of stare decisis, and what are its inherent limita-
tions? It must be understood that the decided case, the precedent, is al-
most universally treated as no more than a point of beginning. The decided
case is said to establish a principle, and it is indeed a principium, a begin-
ning, in the true etymological sense of the word. A principle is therefore a
fundamental assumption which does not foreclose further inquiry. As a
point of departure, the common law judge affirms or asserts the relevance
of a principle extracted from the precedent found to be in point. He then
proceeds to apply it by molding or shaping that principle to meet the needs
of the case at bar. The process of application, whether it results in an
expansion or a restriction of the principle, is more than a mere gloss; it
represents the judge's distinct contribution to the growth and development
of the law. In a discussion of precedents in The Nature of the Judicial
Process, Justice Cardozo wrote:
[lIn a system so highly developed as our own, precedents have so covered
the ground that they fix the point of departure from which the labor of the
judge begins. Almost invariably, his first step is to examine and compare
them. If they are plain and to the point, there may be need of nothing more.
Stare decisis is at least the everyday working rule of our law.,
In the application of a precedent, the jurist must determine the nature
of the authority of that precedent. Is the authority binding or is it merely
persuasive? If it is binding, the principle established in the prior case must
be applied to determine. the disposition of the subsequent case. If the
authority is only persuasive, a variety of additional factors may be consid-
ered to ascertain whether it will be applied and the extent or degree of its
application.
An accurate description of the doctrine of stare decisis will contain a
statement of the limitations upon its applicability. A few definitions, set
forth by those who have explored the doctrine in depth, may be helpful.
For example, Henry Campbell Black, in his Law of Judicial Precedents,
stated:
I B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19-20 (1921).
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A decision is not authority as to any questions of law which were not raised
or presented to the court, and were not considered and decided by it, even
though they were logically present in the case and might have been argued,
and even though such questions, if considered by the court, would have
caused a different judgment to be given.'
Black thus highlights the importance of the issues presented in the prior
case. Were the issues in the present litigation considered and decided in
the previous case? If they were not, even though they could have been, the
prior decision is not a binding precedent.
Of course, the issues raised in a case stem from the facts presented.
The facts of the case, therefore, are of the utmost importance. The Latin
maxim, ex facto jus oritur, tells us that the law arises out of the facts. Of
particular relevance are the following observations by Professor Brum-
baugh:
Decisions are not primarily made that they may serve the future in the form
of precedents, but rather to settle issues between litigants. Their use in after
cases is an incidental aftermath. A decision, therefore, draws its peculiar
quality of justice, soundness and profoundness from the particular facts and
conditions of the case which it has presumed to adjudicate. In order therefore
that this quality may be rendered with the highest measure of accuracy, it
sometimes becomes necessary to expressly limit its application to the pecu-
liar set of circumstances out of which it springs.'
The authority of the precedent thus depends upon and is limited to "the
particular facts and conditions" which the prior case "presumed to adjudi-
cate."
Precedents, therefore, are not to be applied blindly. The precedent
must be analyzed carefully to determine whether there exists a similarity
of facts and issues and to ascertain the actual holding of the court. The
precedent must be studied to determine whether the principle deduced
therefrom is the holding of the case or is merely dictum. Only the holding
of the case is entitled to recognition and respect as binding authority. A
dictum is no more than a remark or observation, and is, at best, merely
persuasive authority. The factors that affect or determine the degree of
persuasiveness to be accorded to dicta are many and varied. How pertinent
is the dictum to the decision wherein it was articulated? Does the court or
judge who authored the dictum enjoy a special reputation for scholarship
and wisdom? Is the dictum reasonable?
The distinction drawn between the holding of a case and its dicta is
warranted by the nature of the adversary system that prevails under the
common law. The reason for this distinction was expressed by Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall, who stated:
H.C. BLACK, LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS § 10, at 37 (1912).
J. BRUMBAUGH, LEGAL REASONING AND BRIEFING 171-72 (1917).
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It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opin-
ion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions
are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not
to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented
for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually
before the Court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent.
Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their
relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is
seldom completely investigated.'
Hence, the holding of a prior case is limited to the principle or rule that
was necessary for the resolution of those factual and legal issues actually
presented and decided. All utterances not necessary to the decision are
dicta.
That a binding decision arises only as a result of litigation has led to
a criticism of the doctrine of precedents. Allen, in Law in the Making,
observed:
Nor is it an entirely unjust criticism that precedents tend to make the devel-
opment of the law depend on accidents of litigation. Important points may
remain at large simply because nobody happens to have brought action upon
them. An erroneous judgment may stand, and acquire an undeserved author-
ity, merely because the losing party does not appeal against it-usually for
the excellent reason that he cannot afford any further costs of litigation."
A further limitation upon the binding authority of a precedent was
recognized in the following quotation from a decision of the New York
Court of Appeals:
[Tihe doctrine of stare decisis, like almost every other legal rule, is not
without its exceptions. It does not apply to a case where it can be shown that
the law has been misunderstood or misapplied, or where the former determi-
nation is evidently contrary to reason. The authorities are abundant to show
that in such cases it is the duty of courts to reexamine the question.'
Similar language of Chancellor Kent is also worthy of quotation:
A solemn decision upon a point of law, arising in any given case, becomes
an authority in a like case, because it is the highest evidence which we can
have of the law applicable to the subject, and the judges are bound to follow
that decision so long as it stands unreversed, unless it can be shown that the
law was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular case.7
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821).
C. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 298 (6th ed. 1958) (footnote omitted).
Rumsey v. New York & N.E.R.R., 133 N.Y. 79, 85, 30 N.E. 654, 655 (1892).
1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *475.
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For Chancellor Kent, a decision that is entitled to precedential value as
binding authority is one that is "solemn." The proposition of law deduced
from the prior case must have been necessary to the decision of that case
and is authority only in a like case. Clearly, a subsequent case may be
distinguishable on the facts or on the issue presented.
Chancellor Kent also wrote of the possibility of a "reversal" of the
prior decision upon a showing that the law "was misunderstood or misap-
plied in that particular case." Reflecting upon the possibility of demon-
strating that a prior case was erroneously decided, Justice Field has stated
that "lilt is more important that the court should be right upon later. and
more elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent with previous
declarations." '
These quotations indicate the limitations which surround the applica-
tion of the doctrine of stare decisis. Experience indicates that in most cases
precedents may be distinguished on the facts or issues presented. Even
should the facts and issues be identical, however, there is also the possibil-
ity of showing that the prior case was erroneously decided and contrary to
reason. Hence, although all prior cases have precedential value, their value
as precedents may differ radically.'
Is the principle deduced from the prior case contained in a thorough,
well-reasoned opinion which was, itself, based upon clear and binding
precedents? Is the precedent one that is seriously weakened either by a
trenchant dissent or by a concurring opinion which casts doubt upon the
wisdom of the majority opinion? Is the applicable principle found in a
single case, or has it been restated and applied in a line of cases which have
reaffirmed its value and social desirability? Clearly, the authoritative
value of precedents varies widely. At the one extreme are those precedents
found binding; at the other extreme are those precedents found to be
completely inapplicable to the present case.
The doctrine of stare decisis thus does not require unbending adher-
ence to past decisions. It permits a court to benefit from the wisdom of the
past, and yet reject the unreasonable and the erroneous. First, the court
must determine whether the principle extracted from the prior case is
applicable. Second, the court must determine to what extent the principle
will be applied. A court may choose to extend a principle beyond the prior
case if it believes that such an action will promote justice. If the applica-
tion of the principle, however, would produce an undesirable result, the
court may narrow or restrict the principle, or it may apply a wholly differ-
ent precedent. It must be noted, therefore, that stare decisis is not merely
a doctrine of stability and uniformity. Its inherent limitations, as well as
Barden v. Northern Pac. R.R., 154 U.S. 288, 322 (1894).
For a discussion of the importance of the doctrine of precedents to the advocate, see E.D.
RE, BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT 91-100 (4th ed. 1974).
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the factors that render prior decisions inapplicable, make possible the
flexibility required for change and progress.
Discussions of stare decisis in a common law system often proceed as
though the system itself is the same as that which prevailed centuries ago.
Ours is still a common law system in which prior decided cases have
precedential value. A most important new element, however, has been
added to the blend of authorities that must be considered by the judge in
the decision of cases. In the past, particularly in the field of private law,
judicial consideration focused essentially upon the authority of prior cases,
while legislative enactments seldom bore upon the decisional law. The
common law system of the modern world, however, must cope with legisla-
tive policy expressed or implied in a multitude of relevant statutes.
Since the common law system developed on a case by case basis and
the effect of legislative policy upon the law was minimal, legislation came
to be regarded almost as an alien field. Justice Cardozo acknowledged the
sense of unease with which legislation was viewed when he said: "The truth
is that many of us, bred in common law traditions, view statutes with a
distrust which we may deplore, but not deny." 0 Chief Justice Stone, writ-
ing of this attitude toward statutes, stated that "the common-law courts
have given little recognition to statutes as starting points for judicial law-
making comparable to judicial decisions.""
Legislation may directly, and indeed abruptly, change or repeal a legal
standard or rule. Courts, however, may only "legislate" to fill an omission
or lacuna in a statute. To use the words of Justice Holmes: "I recognize
without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so
only interstitially . ". .. I' There is no doubt that judges must decide a
casus omissus, the unprovided-for case, for which no specific provision has
been made in the statute. As with judicial precedents, courts may, and in
practice do, expand or restrict the application of the legislative policy.
This, as is well known, is done pursuant to the declared judicial policy of
giving effect to the legislative intent expressed or implied in the relevant
statute.
Today, legislation so extensively covers practically every branch of
law, both public and private, that the principle, the point of beginning,
can no longer be presumed to be a judicial precedent. Often, the point of
beginning must be the legislative policy set forth in a relevant statute.
Courts, of course, must apply and construe statutes. The system, neverthe-
less, requires that courts examine judicial precedents that have previously
employed and construed the applicable statute. At this point, however, a
more serious question is injected into the process. Judges may have a
tendency to attach more significance to judicial precedents than to the
B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 9 (1928).
Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 (1936).
2 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917)(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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legislative policy that those precedents purported to construe and apply.
Courts are thus faced with the difficult task of determining the relative
weight that must be attributed to legislative policy and to judicial preced-
ent. Surely, it is a judicial function to interpret and construe a statute.
Under our tripartite system of government, however, the court must be
faithful to the legislative purpose and policy. The judge must not forget
that ours is a government of three branches, and that in deciding cases he
is fulfilling an institutional responsibility of the court.
Undue or unwarranted reliance upon judicial precedents in the face
of relevant and perhaps overriding legislative policy has caused Dean Irwin
Griswold to decry what he has termed "judicial leapfrogging." Although
his remarks were directed toward an unduly expansive judicial attitude in
construing the United States Constitution, Dean Griswold's criticism is
equally applicable to the judicial construction of statutes. He spoke of the
danger of the process as follows:
The danger here, as elsewhere, is that a sort of decisional leap-
frogging takes over as a principle expands: the first decision is
distilled from the language of the Constitution, but the next
expansion begins from the reasoning of the last decision, and so
on down the line until we reach a point where the words of the
Constitution are so far in the background that they are virtually
ignored. In the end we may be left with a rationale that comes
to little more than, "Well, it really is a good idea. We want a
free society where all of these things can be done and we want
to keep the Government off the backs of the people." There are
governmental processes for bringing such results about, but it
is hard to think that such adumbrations of the Constitution are
an appropriate exercise of judicial power.' 3
The possibilities and variations of "judicial leapfrogging" are infinite.
Many examples are already recorded in the law books. A particularly co-
gent example may be found in the case of Girouard v. United States,"
decided by the Supreme Court in 1946. Girouard filed a petition for natu-
ralization. He stated that he "understood the principles of the government
of the United States, believed in its form of government, and was willing
to take the [statutory] oath of allegiance. '" 5 The oath provided that he
would "support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States
of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic. . .. '" To a ques-
tion in the naturalization application: "'If necessary, are your willing to
take up arms in defense of this country?', [Girouard] replied, 'No (Non-
Griswold, The Judicial Process, 28 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 14, 25 (1973).
328 U.S. 61 (1946), rev'g 149 F.2d 760 (1st Cir. 1945).
328 U.S. at 61-62.
Id. at 62, quoting Act of Oct. 14, 1940, ch. 876, § 335, 54 Stat. 1157 (now 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a)
(1970)).
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combatant) Seventh Day Adventist.' ""v
In an effort to do justice in the particular case, perhaps by the subcon-
scious application of Aristotelean epikeia, the district court admitted Gi-
rouard to citizenship. On the clear and unmistakable authority of United
States v. Schwimmer,6 United States v. Macintosh,' and United States
v. Bland, 2 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, stating that
the facts brought the case "squarely within the principles of these [threel
cases. ' 2' The issue raised in the three Supreme Court precedents was the
statutory construction of the congressional mandate that an alien, before
admission to citizenship, declare on oath that he will "defend the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domes-
tic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same. '22 These statutory
provisions were then reenacted by Congress. 23 Despite this clear indication
of congressional approval of the Schwim mer-Macintosh-B land rationale,
the Girouard Court overruled these cases. 24
The principle of the prior cases was crystal clear. Unless the alien was
willing to respond affirmatively to the question in the application whether,
if necessary, he would be willing to take up arms in defense of this country,
he would not be admitted to citizenship. That Schwimmer, Macintosh,
and Bland stood for the proposition asserted could not be denied since the
Supreme Court had recognized in In re Summers,2" that an alien who
refused to bear arms would not be admitted to citizenship.2 6
Justice Stone, for cogent reasons, joined in the dissents of Chief Jus-
tice Hughes in the Macintosh2- and Bland2 cases. Adopting substantially
the same rationale as that previously expressed in the Hughes-Stone dis-
sents, the Supreme Court in Girouard reversed the circuit court of appeals.
In admitting Girouard to citizenship, even though he refused to state that
he would bear arms, the Court stated: "We conclude that the Schwimmer,
Macintosh, and Bland cases do not state the correct rule of law. -2 9
One would think that they, Chief Justice Stone and the other Jus-
tices, who had dissented in the earlier cases 30 would have regarded this
17 328 U.S. at 62.
" 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
" 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
2" 283 U.S. 636 (1931).
21 149 F.2d 760, 763 (1st Cir. 1945), rev'd, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
'2 Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 4, 34 Stat. 596 (now 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1970)).
Act of Oct. 14, 1940, ch. 876, § 335, 54 Stat. 1157 (now 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1970)).
21 328 U.S. at 69.
2 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
"I Id. at 572.
27 283 U.S. at 627 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
" 283 U.S. at 637 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
29 328 U.S. at 69.
" In both Macintosh and Bland, Chief Justice Hughes was joined in his dissents by Justices
Stone, Brandeis, and Holmes.
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express overruling of the prior cases and the adoption of their dissenting
views as a genuine vindication. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Stone again
dissented in Girouard. He began his dissent by stating:
I think the judgment should be affirmed, for the reason that the court below,
in applying the controlling provisions of the naturalization statutes, correctly
applied them as earlier construed by this Court, whose construction Congress
has adopted and confirmed.3'
Chief Justice Stone indicated that the "only question [in the prior cases]
was of construction of the statute which Congress at all times has been free
to amend if dissatisfied with the construction adopted by the Court.13 2 He
explained that he and three other Justices had dissented in Macintosh and
Bland "for reasons which the Court now adopts as ground for overruling
them. 1' 3 Because of his firm view that Congress had adopted and con-
firmed the Court's earlier construction of the naturalization statutes, the
Chief Justice regarded the Court's overruling of those cases as judicial
action that would "discourage, if not . . .deny, legislative responsibil-
ity."34 With Justices Reed and Frankfurter joining in his dissenting opin-
ion, Chief Justice Stone concluded that "[i]t is not the function of this
Court to disregard the will of Congress in the exercise of its constitutional
power. "35
These cases clearly demonstrate the differing judicial views that may
prevail. Chief Justice Stone stated, in effect, that his dissenting opinions
were not the law of the land. If they were to be adopted to effect a change
in the law set forth in the earlier cases, such a policy determination should
have been made by the Legislature. Of course, it was a judicial question
whether the principle of law enunciated in the earlier cases had, in fact,
been adopted by the Congress. This question was whether there had been
legislative acquiescence in the judicial construction of the statute. In his
dissent in Girouard, Chief Justice Stone noted that six successive Con-
gresses had declined to adopt proposals or amendments that would have
overturned the rulings in Schwimmer, Bland, and Macintosh,"R the three
cases expressly overruled by Girouard. He also noted that prior to
Girouard, the state and federal courts had consistently applied the rule
espoused in the three prior cases.37
There is little doubt that the earlier cases, until overruled by
328 U.S. at 70 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 72 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
:1 Id. (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
:11 Id. at 76 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
I; Id. at 79 (Stone, C.J., dissenting). For a discussion of the overruling of existing authority,
see E.D. RE, BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT 93-97 (4th ed. 1974).
:1 Id. at 74 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
37 Id. (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
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Girouard, represented the law of the land. Consequently, the state and
federal courts acted correctly and properly in applying the principle for
which these cases stood. Indeed, Chief Justice Stone quoted from one pre-
Girouard case wherein the court of appeals had noted that proposed
amendments to the statutes at issue had been rejected, and stated: "We
must conclude, therefore, that these statutory requirements as construed
by the Supreme Court have congressional sanction and approval." :
The Girouard example suggests that one's philosophy about the sepa-
ration of powers of the three branches of government may also play a vital
role in determining judicial attitudes toward judicial precedents and legis-
lative policy. The factors are many that a judge will intuitively, deliber-
ately, or unconsciously consider in determining the weight to be given prior
judicial pronouncements. Is the court dealing with an isolated precedent
or a series of well-reasoned opinions? Has the precedent that is being urged
upon the court been eroded by decisions that have restricted its
application? Have changed conditions rendered the precedent obsolete?
With what degree of authority may the court speak? Is it a trial court or
an appellate court? Surely, if a court can speak with finality on a particular
question, it will determine for itself the particular balance that will be
struck between stability and change. The court will make a value judg-
ment as to the desirability of following the past or effecting change. If the
decision is to bring about change, we can only hope that it be progress:"
" Id. at 74-75 (Stone, C.J., dissenting), quoting Beale v. United States, 71 F.2d 737, 739 (8th
Cir. 1934).
"' Extensive discussion of the doctrine of stare decisis within the judicial process is found in
W. DOUGLAS, STARE DECISIS (1949); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS (1960).
